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Emotion Regulation Process in Distress and Fear Liabilities: Maladaptive Evaluation of 
Regulatory Strategies 
The contribution of emotion regulation in the development and maintenance of 
psychopathology has repeatedly been highlighted in the literature and a substantial amount of 
work has been conducted about the specific regulatory strategies individuals with different forms 
of psychopathology employ (Gross, 2015). However, current research has focused attention on 
the relationship between emotion regulation and specific mental disorders as they are defined in 
the predominant nosological system (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th 
edition [DSM-5]; APA, 2013). However, this method of conceptualizing mental illness has 
received criticism due to its categorical view of psychopathology (Krueger & Markon, 2006a). 
Additionally, empirical research has largely disregarded the mechanism through which emotion 
generation leads to the use of specific regulatory strategies and the contribution of this 
mechanism to the expression of psychopathology (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015). These gaps in 
existing literature motivated the current study, which aimed to examine how emotion regulation 
is manifested in individuals with strong liability toward internalizing difficulties (e.g., depression 
and specific phobias). The liberation from the diagnostic categories of the current nosological 
system may provide a better understanding of the mechanism through which emotion regulation 
is expressed in the broad range of internalizing psychopathology and how the emotion regulation 
process manifests in the higher-order liabilities underlying internalizing disorders (Krueger & 
Markon, 2006a). 
Conceptualization of Psychopathology  
Current nosological systems. Most psychopathology research to date is guided by the 
conceptualization of psychopathology adopted by the current nosological systems, the 
EMOTION REGULATION IN DISTRESS AND FEAR LIABILITIES          3 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD). These nosological systems conceptualize mental disorders as 
discrete categorical entities. In these diagnostic manuals, several categories of mental disorder 
are listed, the membership in which depends on whether an individual meets a number of 
suggested criteria (APA, 2013; WHO, 2016). Thus, an individual is either a member or 
nonmember of these categories (Krueger & Markon, 2006a). The DSM-5 acknowledged the 
limitations of this approach and provided several assumptions that needed to be met in order for 
this categorization to be valid. Specifically, they said that a categorical approach to classification 
works best when there is diagnostic group homogeneity, when the boundaries between 
diagnostic categories are clear, and when the different diagnostic categories are mutually 
exclusive (APA, 2013).  
However, research has shown that the assumptions guiding these classification systems 
are problematic. First, diagnostic categories are highly heterogeneous with individuals classified 
similarly despite wide differences in the number and nature of their symptoms (Sanislow et al., 
2010). Second, evidence from taxometric analyses suggests that most of the DSM disorders are 
underpinned by dimensions, not categories (Rowa, Hood, & Antony, 2013). Consequently, the 
boundaries imposed across the different categories may be arbitrary cut-offs on domains of 
functioning (Widiger & Samuel, 2005). Third, the high levels of comorbidity (or covariation) of 
mental disorders, with the rate dramatically increasing across the lifespan, raises questions about 
the core features of the multiple diagnoses (Widiger & Samuel, 2005). Although discussions in 
the scientific community urged a departure from this conceptualization of psychopathology, a 
categorical classification system prevailed again with the introduction of the DSM-5 (APA, 
2013). This impedes not only scientific research on the etiology and nature of 
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psychopathological difficulties, but also the effective treatment of these difficulties in clinical 
settings.  
Alternative conceptualizations: dimensional models. Limitations of the dominant 
categorical conceptualization of psychopathology have led to the consideration of alternative 
conceptualizations. A dimensional approach has been proposed as an attempt to overcome the 
problems of comorbidity between- and heterogeneity within the diagnostic categories. 
Specifically, conceptualizing psychopathology as variations in multiple dimensions of disordered 
thought, affect, and behavior, allows for modeling comorbidity as a pattern of elevations in 
different dimensions (Krueger, Watson, & Barlow, 2005). Additionally, adopting a dimensional 
approach could better address issues of heterogeneity by isolating correlates of specific 
dimensions in models that control for the influence of other psychopathological dimensions 
(Krueger, Watson, & Barlow, 2005).  
In order to explain the comorbidity of mental disorders, Neale and Kendler (1995) 
developed several multifactorial models. The associated liabilities model that they proposed, in 
which comorbidity arises as a result of the correlation of the risk factors of these disorders, was 
the starting point for the hierarchical dimensional approach in psychopathology. Krueger (1999), 
adopting a dimensional approach, performed confirmatory factor analyses in patterns of 
comorbidity among ten common mental disorders and found that a two-factor model had the best 
fit. The first factor reflected externalizing difficulties and was composed of alcohol dependence, 
drug dependence, and antisocial personality disorder. The second factor was an internalizing 
factor composed of internalizing problems. This factor bifurcated to two subdimensions 
including fear (social phobia, simple phobia, agoraphobia, panic disorder) and anxious-misery 
(major depression, dysthymia, generalized anxiety disorder). Kendler and colleagues (2003) 
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confirmed the same factors and demonstrated that the comorbidity in internalizing and 
externalizing disorders, and within anxious-misery and fear disorders are driven primarily by 
shared genetic factors.  
Internalizing-externalizing transdiagnostic factor model. The model proposed by 
Krueger (1999) and Kendler and colleagues (2003) is a liability spectrum model in which the 
multiple disorders are understood as manifestations of latent liability factors (Eaton, Rodriguez- 
Seijas, Carragher, & Krueger, 2015; Krueger & Markon, 2006b). Krueger and Markon’s (2006b) 
meta-analysis of multivariate studies supported the two-factor liability model for internalizing 
and externalizing dysfunctions with internalizing bifurcating in fear and distress liabilities. These 
liabilities were conceived as indirectly observed or latent natural tendencies to develop directly 
observed or manifest disorders, and evidence for their continuity was provided (Krueger & 
Markon, 2006b). This model allows for the transcendence of the distinction between normal and 
abnormal phenomena and views psychopathology as variations in normal-range personality traits 
(Krueger et al., 2007). The externalizing liability is thought to underlie disorders, such as 
conduct disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and addictive disorders, linked to disinhibitory 
traits (Krueger & Markon, 2006b). The distress liability of the internalizing spectrum is thought 
to underlie major depression, dysthymia, and generalized anxiety disorder, whereas the fear 
liability is thought to underlie social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and specific phobias 
(Krueger & Markon, 2006b).  
The two subordinate liabilities of the internalizing spectrum, which will be the focus of 
the proposed study, are thought to be correlated but separable factors. They are linked to high 
levels of distress/negative affect and trait neuroticism (Barlow et al., 2014; Brown et al., 1998; 
Griffith et al., 2010; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996; Watson, 2009). The distress liability has been  
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strongly related to demoralization, characterized by unhappiness, dysphoric mood, sense of 
helplessness and inability to cope with one’s current circumstances, and general dissatisfaction 
with one’s condition (Sellbom et al., 2008). The fear liability, on the other hand, has been 
strongly linked to negative activation or dysfunctional negative emotions and fearfulness related 
to avoidance (Sellbom et al., 2008). Thus, emotional dysfunctions are thought to be the core of 
both of these liabilities.  
Emotion and Emotion Regulation  
Emotions have been studied in a wide range of mental disorders, and especially in 
internalizing disorders (Berenbaum et al., 2003; Kring, 2008). They have been defined as 
internal processes that attempt to promote adaptation. They are generated through stages, 
including attending to a situation, giving a valenced meaning, and responding experientially, 
behaviorally, and physiologically (Berenbaum et al., 2003; Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015). 
According to Gross (2015), emotions are under the umbrella of affect, a general category 
including stress responses (i.e., unspecified affective responses to situations perceived as 
unmanageable), moods (i.e., diffuse, long lasting, valenced states), and emotions (i.e., short-lived 
valenced states elicited by specific events). Since emotions were developed through human 
evolution to prepare for action in response to environmental stimuli, they generally have adaptive 
nature and serve important inter- and intra-personal functions (Kring, 2008). However, emotions 
can become maladaptive depending on the degree of emotional valence, emotional intensity, and 
disconnection (e.g., facial expressions are not compatible with the subjective experience of 
emotion) disturbances (Berenbaum et al., 2003). Generally, in order to regulate maladaptive 
emotional experiences, individuals modify them through emotion regulation processes.  
Various conceptualizations of emotion regulation have been proposed (Bloch, Moran, & 
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Kring, 2010). Several scholars conceptualize emotion generation and emotion regulation as 
inseparable processes and suggest that all types of emotion are likely regulated to some extent 
(e.g. Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004; Davidson, 2000). Others support that differentiating 
between emotion generation and emotion regulation is important to understand the nature of 
emotion-related problems, and emotion-related disturbances in psychopathology (Bloch, Moran, 
& Kring, 2010). Gross et al. (1998, p. 275), who aligns with the latter group of scholars, 
proposed the most influential definition which views emotion regulation as the “processes by 
which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they 
experience and express these emotions.” Again, emotion regulation can be seen as part of the 
general umbrella of affect regulation which involves our efforts to influence our negative or 
positive states (Gross, 2015). Affect regulation includes coping (i.e., long lasting efforts directed 
to the alleviation of stress), mood regulation (i.e., efforts to alter subjective feeling states), and 
emotion regulation (i.e., efforts to alter specific emotions and the related behavioral responses). 
Emotion regulation is thought to take place when there is an activation of a goal that recruits one 
or more processes to influence emotion generation (Fernandez, Jazaieri, & Gross, 2016; Sheppes, 
Suri, & Gross, 2015) with ultimate goal to appropriately respond to environmental demands 
(Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007; Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Gross, 
1998; Thompson, 1994). The target of this regulatory goal can be intrinsic, aiming at a change in 
the person who experiences the emotion, or extrinsic, targeting a change to someone else (Gross, 
1998). The motivation can be short-term or long-term and aim to a decrease or increase of the 
facets of the emotional responding (intensity, duration, frequency; Gross, 1998).  
Emotion regulation is not inherently adaptive or maladaptive (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). It 
is considered adaptive when the person achieves to influence emotion generation in the desired 
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way, containing the emotion experience sufficiently to continue engaging in goal-directed 
behaviors (Fernandez, Jazaieri, & Gross, 2016). On the other hand, emotion regulation can 
become maladaptive, when the person fails to influence the emotion generation process, either 
by failing to engage in emotion regulation or by using inadequate strategies for the situation 
leading to under-regulation or over-regulation of emotion (Fernandez, Jazaieri, & Gross, 2016).  
The role of emotion regulation deficits in the development of psychopathology has long 
been emphasized in the literature (Gross, 2015). Previous studies attempting to identify the 
mechanisms through which emotion regulation contributes to the emergence or maintenance of 
psychopathology primarily focused attention on the regulatory strategies that individuals with 
psychopathology tend to use (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015). Emotion regulation strategies are 
the approach that individuals adopt in order to up-regulate (increase magnitude of the emotional 
response) or down-regulate (decrease the magnitude of the emotional response) their emotions 
(Koole, 2009). Over the years, different theoretical models have highlighted different specific 
strategies with respect to their efficacy to regulate emotion, that often have been classified as 
adaptive or maladaptive (Aldao et al., 2010). However, adaptiveness and maladaptiveness of 
regulatory strategies seem to highly depend on contextual factors (Aldao, 2013; Troy, Shallcross, 
Mauss, 2013).  
Theoretical models of emotion regulation. The most prominent theory for emotion 
regulation is the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998). This model is based on an 
information processing framework and describes five general regulatory strategies that 
individuals use to regulate emotion in a specific time point during the emotion generation 
process. Specifically, the person might choose to regulate at a very early stage of the generation 
process aiming to change the complete course of an emotional situation (e.g., avoid situations; 
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situation selection). At a later stage, the person may choose to change external features of the 
situation to modify its emotional impact (e.g., shorten the exposure time to the situation; 
situation modification). Alternatively, the person may decide to change focus to another aspect 
of a situation and to modify information processing (e.g., distract oneself from the situation; 
attentional deployment) or he/she may change the meaning of a situation (e.g., reappraisal of the 
emotional meaning; cognitive change). Finally, the person may choose to regulate at the latest 
stage of the emotion generation process, through response modulation, i.e. to modify 
experiential, behavioral, physiological components of the elicited responses (e.g., expressive 
suppression; Gross, 1998).  
This model has two important strengths. First, it identifies distinct processes in the 
emotion regulation framework which can be studied separately in psychopathology research 
(Bloch, Moran, & Kring, 2010). Second, this model allows for consideration of deficits in self as 
well as deficits related to influences in others (Bloch et al., 2010). These advantages have led 
researchers who study the relationship between emotion regulation and psychopathology to 
prefer the process model conceptualization of emotion regulation (Bloch et al., 2010). However, 
accumulated research in the field of emotion regulation demonstrated that between emotion 
generation and the implementation of specific strategies other processes take place (Gross, 2015; 
Sheppes et al., 2015). These processes need to be incorporated in the theoretical model in order 
to more fully understand emotion regulation and its influence on adaptive and maladaptive 
behavior (Bonanno, & Burton, 2013). Based on this premise, Sheppes, Suri, and Gross (2015) 
developed the extended process model.  
According to the extended process model, emotion generation leads to emotion regulation 
through a valuation process, in other words a process involving the determination of value of a 
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number of available, emotionally charged, options (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015). This process 
involves multiple valuation systems, each of which includes an initial stimulus, and the elements 
of Perception, Valuation, and Action. Specifically, internal or external stimuli (World) give rise 
to Perception. After perceived, these stimuli are valued as either positive or negative (Valuation) 
and activate specific Actions (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015). The output of one Valuation cycle 
becomes the initial stimulus for another. Thus, the mechanism of emotion regulation involves the 
alternation of several valuation systems (regulatory stages) that give rise to one another through 
the processes of perception, valuation and action (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015).  
The regulatory stages that lead from emotion generation to emotion change are three 
interacting valuation systems (i.e., identification, selection, and implementation regulatory 
stages) iterating across time enabling the monitoring of the process (Gross, 2015). Each of these 
stages results in a regulatory decision (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015). Specifically, the 
identification valuation system involves the decision to regulate or not; the selection stage 
involves the decision of which available general regulatory category to use; and, the 
implementation valuation system entails the decision to implement a specific regulatory tactic. 
Each of these Valuation systems includes the basic elements of Perception, Valuation, and 
Action, allowing for more process specificity (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015). Sheppes, Suri, and 
Gross (2015) suggested that the different psychopathological problems might relate to deficits in 
the three basic elements in each of the three regulatory stages.  
An example of this process in real life is the following. A person is being fired by her 
supervisor. This situation elicits sadness, which is the result of her emotion-generative process 
(world). In the identification stage this emotion, i.e., sadness, is being detected (perception step). 
After its detection, through an evaluation process (valuation step), the person determines whether 
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this emotion is adequately negative and, thus, whether it needs to be regulated. If sadness elicited 
by the person’s firing is valued sufficiently negative, a regulation goal will be activated (action 
step). The output of the identification stage (i.e., the activation of the sadness regulation goal) 
constitutes the world step for the selection stage. Sadness will be regulated via an emotion 
regulation strategy. Attentional deployment and cognitive change are the available strategies for 
sadness regulation represented in this person’s working memory (perception step). She decides 
that attentional deployment is the most suitable strategy to use, because the level of her sadness 
is too intense (valuation step). Therefore, the goal of using attentional deployment is being 
activated (action step) and the output of this process constitutes the input for the implementation 
stage. In the perception step, this person perceives the different tactics that would help her shift 
her attention, such as distracting herself by watching a movie or reading her favorite novel. In the 
valuation step, she assigns values to these available tactics and decides that watching a movie 
would more effectively distract her and, thus, better help her regulate her sadness. Through the 
implementation of this tactic her sadness is being regulated (action step). After the initial 
implementation of the regulatory tactic, this person monitors its effectiveness across time and 
activates new regulation goals if necessary.  
Emotion Regulation Process and Psychopathology  
Thus far, research regarding the role of emotion regulation on psychopathology 
disregards two main points. First, current empirical research has focused attention on the action 
element of the implementation stage in the regulatory process, which is the application of 
inappropriate regulatory strategies (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015). For example, the maladaptive 
use of rumination (a repetitive focus on the experience of the emotion and its causes and 
consequences as a strategy to understand and solve an individuals’ problems), as well as 
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avoidance (the avoidance of emotions and thoughts to reduce distress) have been implicated in 
the etiology of several internalizing disorders (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). 
However, although valuable, research focusing solely on the implementation stage of emotion 
regulation (i.e., studying the specific strategy that the individual implements) overlooks the 
mechanism leading to the use of this strategy. Second, current research has put effort on 
explicating the relationships between emotion regulation and several DSM-defined mental 
disorders, with scarce study on the commonalities within psychopathology liabilities (i.e., 
internalizing and externalizing spectra). Restricting research to specific disorders deters from 
identifying an emotion regulation mechanism that disorders with common underlying liabilities 
share. In an effort to contribute to this line of research and address these gaps in the literature, the 
current study attempted to isolate the valuation element in the selection stage of emotion 
regulation and its relationship with the distress and fear liabilities.  
Adaptive valuation in the selection stage. An adaptive valuation element in the 
selection stage involves the accurate assignment of weights in the different general regulatory 
strategies based on the perceived benefits and costs of each strategy that were acquired through 
past experience (Sheppes et al., 2014; 2015). Several factors that influence the assignment of 
specific weights are cognitive resources (e.g., cognitive control abilities; Urry & Gross, 2010), 
physiological resources (e.g. availability of blood glucose; Baumeister, 2003; Beedie & Lane, 
2012), type and strength of the emotional impulse (e.g., increased stress exposure; Raio, 
Orederu, Palazzolo, Shurick, & Phelps, 2013; Sheppes & Gross, 2011), and motivational factors 
(e.g., short-term versus long-term goals; Sheppes & Gross, 2011).  
Choosing to regulate emotion in an earlier or later temporal point in the emotion 
generation process has different costs and benefits. For example, Sheppes et al. (2011, 2014) 
EMOTION REGULATION IN DISTRESS AND FEAR LIABILITIES          13 
using the emotion regulation choice paradigm tested factors that influence the selection of two 
major strategies: reappraisal, as a form of cognitive change, and distraction, as a form of 
attentional deployment (Sheppes et al. 2011, 2014). This paradigm isolated the Valuation 
element in the selection regulatory stage by examining how differential weights are assigned to 
the two regulatory strategies, based on a cost-benefit analysis. Distraction, which involves the 
inhibition of emotional information (and, thus, early disengagement from the emotional 
information) before it escalates, provides the advantage of successful modification of high- 
intensity emotional information (Sheppes et al. 2011, 2014). Additionally, in the cognitive 
domain, distraction entails the activation of relatively simple processes, since the content of the 
alternative thoughts generated to distract attention from the situation is neutral and, therefore, not 
conflicting with the original emotional information. However, a disadvantage of this regulatory 
strategy is that, motivationally, it does not enable processing, evaluating, and preserving 
emotional information in the long-term memory. Such emotional information could potentially 
promote one’s long-term goals and adaptation (Sheppes et al. 2011, 2014).  
On the other hand, the benefits of reappraisal, which involve engagement with emotional 
information, motivationally include the enabling of processing, evaluating, and remembering 
emotional information, which are crucial for long-term goals and adaptation (Sheppes et al. 
2011, 2014). One cost of reappraisal is that it is emotionally costly, as it can less successfully 
inhibit high-intensity emotional information. This is because it requires elaborated semantic 
processing that occurs prior to late modulation. In the cognitive domain, a cost of reappraisal is 
that it requires the activation of relatively complex processes due to the requirement of producing 
alternative interpretations of a situation which are in conflict with the initial emotional 
information. Thus, according to Sheppes et al. (2011, 2014) an adaptive Valuation profile 
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sensitive to the costs and benefits of each regulatory category involves selecting cognitive 
change when the intensity of the emotional information is low, when cognitive generation is 
simple, and when long-term relief is the goal of the emotion regulation. By contrast, individuals 
favor attentional deployment to cognitive change when emotional intensity is high, when 
cognitive generation is complex, and when short-term relief is the ultimate goal. A correct cost- 
benefit analysis increases the likelihood of effective regulation of maladaptive emotion (Gross, 
2015; Sheppes et al., 2015).  
Maladaptive valuation in fear and distress disorders. Gross (2015) and Sheppes et al. 
(2015) suggested that deficits in emotion regulation related to psychopathology may arise from 
problems in the valuation process of the available general regulatory categories. More 
specifically, a valuation problem may involve erroneous analysis of the costs and benefits of 
engagement and disengagement emotion regulation strategies depending on contextual factors.  
Deficits in valuation in fear disorders. Regarding fear disorders, there is evidence to 
suggest that individuals who are prone to fear may have the tendency to deviate from choosing to 
engage in low-intensity emotional information when long term relief is the ultimate goal (or, in 
other words, maladaptive weighing of the motivational costs of distraction). Research has 
demonstrated that individuals diagnosed with specific phobias, social anxiety, and panic disorder 
have a tendency to disengage from fear-provoking emotional information (Cisler & Koster, 
2010; Garner et al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2004; Pflugshaupt et al., 2005). Specifically, there is 
evidence to suggest that individuals with fear disorders tend to demonstrate attentional bias 
toward threat, which refers to the differential allocation of attention in threatening versus neutral 
stimuli (Cisler & Koster, 2010). For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to differentiate 
between early stage information processing biases, that occur early in the processing of threat 
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cues, and late stage processing biases that occur later in the process (Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
Individuals with fear disorders tend to direct attention toward the threatening information at an 
early stage of the process, but increased exposure to this information results in shifting attention 
away from it (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Koster et al., 2005). Attentional avoidance is the tendency 
to allocate attention to aspects of experience in the opposite direction of the threat cue (Koster et 
al., 2005; Mogg et al., 2004). Attentional avoidance of threat in specific and social phobias, and 
panic disorders have been demonstrated through measuring eye fixations in studies using the dot 
probe task, the exogenous cueing task, and the visual search task (Garner et al., 2006; Mogg et 
al., 2004; Pflugshaupt et al., 2005). Thus, attentional avoidance among fearful individuals may 
reflect an attempt to strategically regulate negative affect through disengaging from fear- 
provoking stimuli (Cisler & Koster, 2010).  
Research has also shown that individuals with fear disorders often demonstrate an 
overreliance on experiential avoidance, which involves an effort to avoid, escape, or hide 
unpleasant emotions or thoughts (Hayes et al., 1996), as a regulation strategy in fear provoking 
situations. For example, Kashdan and colleagues (2013) found that participants with social 
anxiety disorder adopted experiential avoidance more often in social interactions in their daily 
life compared to control participants. Additionally, individuals with panic disorder have been 
found to adopt experiential avoidance related to bodily arousal (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010).  
Lastly, it has been suggested that individuals diagnosed with fear disorders tend to 
overgeneralize their disengagement responses to emotional stimuli of lower emotional intensity 
and to situations involving emotional information, attendance of which is required for goal- 
directed behavior (e.g., when a socially anxious person needs to attend an interview – a fear 
provoking situation – to secure a job) (Campbell-Sills, & Barlow, 2007; Foa, & Kozak, 1986). 
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Although useful for short-term relief, disengagement strategies like distraction from an 
emotional experience can perpetuate fear (Sheppes et al., 2014). For example, in the case of 
social anxiety disorder, it has been suggested that socially anxious individuals tend to overvalue 
avoidance, even when the short-term relief associated with avoiding a social engagement comes 
at a longer-term price (Gross, 2015).  
Deficits in valuation in distress disorders. Deviation from choosing to disengage from 
high-intensity emotional stimuli may be seen in individuals who are prone to distress, who may 
not be sensitive to the costs of engagement in high-intensity emotional information (i.e., it is less 
successful in blocking high-intensity emotional information). The increased preference for 
engagement with high-intensity emotional information in individuals with disorders 
characterized by high distress is evident by the increased use of rumination as a strategy to 
regulate negative emotion (Sheppes et al. 2012).  
Rumination is the tendency to over-attend to an emotional experience and process its 
meaning and consequences repetitively (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Cognitive reappraisal is the 
process by which an individual attends to an emotion arousing experience and attempts to 
transform its meaning, as a result of changing the way that an individual thinks about this 
experience (Gross, 1998). A common characteristic of rumination and reappraisal is the 
involvement of attending to the emotional information elicited by a situation and the active 
processing of its negative meaning (Cohen et al., 2014). Therefore, in both reappraisal and 
rumination a focus on the emotional information is central, in which distressed individuals 
engage in excess. Although seemingly very different, research has suggested that a shared 
cognitive mechanism and neural basis may underlie these two strategies (Cohen et al., 2014; Ray 
et al., 2005). This mechanism might include the participation of inhibition, working memory 
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updating, and set shifting (Cohen et al., 2014; McRae et al., 2012; Whitmer and Gotlib, 2013).  
However, the literature suggests that rumination is a maladaptive strategy that perpetuates 
negative emotion, whereas reappraisal is generally adaptive and related to successful emotion 
regulation (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). It has been suggested that individuals 
diagnosed with distress-related disorders may remain trapped in a cycle of rumination in an 
effort to understand themselves and their emotional experience (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; 
Simpson & Papageorgiou, 2003), failing, therefore, to effectively implement reappraisal and 
alter the emotional response. Thus, it is plausible that high in distress individuals attempt to use 
reappraisal to downregulate emotion (and potentially in excess since they tend to seek 
engagement in the emotional experience), but they may not succeed in their effort to successfully 
implement it and this failure may happen through a difficulty in breaking the vicious cycle of 
rumination.  
Cohen et al. (2014), based on existing research, proposed a bidirectional relationship 
between the ability to inhibit negative emotion and the two emotion regulation strategies. 
Specifically, it is thought that inhibition, defined as the ability to suppress automatic responses 
with purpose the effective engagement in goal-directed behavior (Friedman & Miyake, 2004), 
has a causal relationship with these strategies, positive with reappraisal (Cohen et al., 2012; 
Joormann and Gotlib, 2010; Ochsner & Gross, 2005) and negative with rumination (Salas et al., 
2014). In turn, habitual use of these two strategies may lead to enhanced or impaired inhibition 
(Philippot & Brutoux, 2008). Thus, impaired inhibition may be the link between distress 
disorders and failure to implement reappraisal.  
Additionally, although cognitive reappraisal is mainly utilized to reduce the unpleasant 
emotional arousal evoked by a stressful event, in high-intensity emotion it may lead to the 
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increase of negative emotions by allowing an individual to overthink the negative stimulus and 
perceive it worse than initially (Sheppes et al., 2014). Reappraisal, as a type of cognitive change, 
generally has been studied as an adaptive emotion regulation strategy, which individuals with 
emotional disorders usually fail to use. However, literature has for the most part evaluated the 
implementation of this strategy in individuals with distress-related disorders (Gross, 2015; 
Sheppes et al., 2015). Individuals with emotional difficulties might indeed fail to use reappraisal. 
However, this failure might come from the fact that they are trying to use it when in high distress 
(a usual phenomenon for these individuals) where it is not effective in blocking negative emotion 
(Raio et al., 2013). What is not clear yet is whether these individuals, and especially those with a 
strong liability toward distress, have the intention, and attempt, to reappraise as well as under 
what circumstances. Based on the evidence supporting an excessive preference of persons with 
distress difficulties to engage in thinking over emotions, one would expect that the distress 
liability may be associated with lack of differentiation between costs and benefits of engaging 
with emotion. As a result individuals with higher proneness to distress are expected to use 
reappraisal more frequently than those with lower proneness to distress, regardless of the 
intensity of the stimulus and motivational goal. 
Current Study  
The adoption of specific regulatory strategies in different disorders has been well studied 
in previous research (Gross, 2015). However, how individuals reach a decision as to what 
regulatory strategy to employ and how this decision relates to internalizing psychopathology has 
scarcely been studied. Additionally, existing research studying emotion regulation in the context 
of psychopathology is restricted to DSM-defined categorical entities, which is related to two 
problems. First, research has demonstrated that the assumptions guiding the DSM classification 
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system are problematic and that this categorical system has a limited ability to fully explain 
psychopathology. Second, restricting research to specific disorders deters form identifying an 
emotion regulation mechanism that disorders with common underlying liabilities share. In order 
to address these gaps in the literature, the current study attempted to examine a potential 
mechanism through which the higher-order internalizing liability may be linked to deficits in the 
emotion regulation process. More specifically, this study aimed to investigate whether there are 
deficits in the valuation element of the selection stage of the regulatory process within the 
internalizing spectrum.  
Based on the literature just discussed several specific hypotheses were formulated. First, 
the literature reviewed previously provides compelling evidence that individuals diagnosed with 
fear disorders have a tendency to disengage from fear-provoking emotional information, which is 
shown by their frequent adoption of experiential or attentional avoidance in situations involving 
these fear provoking stimuli (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Kashdan et al., 2013; Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010). Additionally, it seems that they overgeneralize these responses to less intense 
emotional stimuli (Campbell-Sills, & Barlow, 2007; Foa, & Kozak, 1986). Based on this 
evidence, it was hypothesized that the fear liability is associated with a maladaptive evaluation of 
available regulatory strategies. More specifically, it was hypothesized that the fear liability 
would moderate the effect of emotional intensity on strategy selection, such that the effect of 
emotional intensity on strategy selection would become smaller as standing on the fear liability 
increased. In other words, at higher levels of the fear liability, the odds of choosing distraction 
would remain elevated across all levels of emotional intensity. It was also hypothesized that the 
fear liability would moderate the effect of goal proximity on the odds of choosing distraction, 
such that the effect of goal proximity on strategy selection would become smaller as standing on 
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the fear liability increased. In other words, at higher levels of the fear liability, the odds of 
choosing distraction would remain elevated in both goal proximity conditions.  
Second, the research summarized above shows that individuals with disorders 
characterized by high distress demonstrate an increased preference for excessive engagement in 
high-intensity emotional information that is evident by their increased use of rumination as a 
strategy to regulate negative emotion (Sheppes et al., 2012). Given that rumination is thought to 
share a common mechanism with reappraisal the implementation of which might fail in 
individuals high in distress because of impaired inhibition (Cohen et al., 2014), it was 
hypothesized that the distress liability is associated with a maladaptive evaluation of available 
regulatory strategies. More specifically, it was hypothesized that the distress liability would 
moderate the effect of emotional intensity on strategy selection such that the effect of emotional 
intensity on strategy selection would become smaller with the increase of the distress liability. In 
other words, at higher levels of the distress liability, the odds of choosing reappraisal would 
remain elevated across all levels of emotional intensity. It was also hypothesized that the distress 
liability would moderate the effect of goal proximity on the odds of choosing distraction such 
that the effect of goal proximity on strategy selection would become smaller as standing on the 
distress liability increased. In other words, at higher levels of the distress liability, the odds of 
choosing reappraisal would remain elevated in both goal proximity conditions.   
To test these hypotheses, the emotion regulation choice paradigm developed by Sheppes 
and colleagues (2011) was employed. This paradigm isolates the Valuation element in the 
selection stage of the regulatory process by enabling the investigation of the emotional and 
motivational factors that play a role in the selection of two regulatory categories: reappraisal (as 
an engagement regulatory strategy) and distraction (as a disengagement regulatory strategy). 
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Previous research has shown that individuals from the general population value positively 
engagement strategies when the intensity of the emotional information is low, and the long-term 
relief is the goal of the emotion regulation, while they favor disengagement strategies when 
emotional intensity is high, and short-term relief is the ultimate goal (Sheppes et al., 2014). 
Therefore, by demonstrating that individuals with strong liability toward internalizing difficulties 
are not sensitive to the costs and benefits of these strategies, this study can identify deficits in the 
valuation element of the selection stage in their regulatory process.  
Methods 
Participants  
Participants in the current study were undergraduate students studying at Ball State 
University. They were selected through the university research pool. In order to ensure that 
individuals representing the full range of the internalizing liability were solicited for 
participation, a screening procedure was conducted. Specifically, in order to avoid over-selection 
of participants in one pole of the internalizing continuum (e.g., participants with very low levels 
of internalizing), candidate participants completed online self-report measures assessing 
internalizing-related problems, including the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) and the Beck 
Anxiety Inventory (BAI; see description below). Their scores on these measures indicated the 
level of anxiety or depressive symptomatology that they experience. An effort was made to 
identify a final sample pool in which half of the participants were closer to the lower end of the 
continuum and the other half were closer to the higher end of the continuum. Subsequently, an 
invitation was sent to this final sample pool through email to come to the lab and complete the 
next phase of the study.  
In the first part of the study (online portion), the sample consisted of 675 participants 
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with mean age = 19 (SD= 1.90, range = 18-49). From those 675 participants, 458 (68%) 
identified as female, 203 (30%) as male, and 7 (1%) selected “other” in the gender question. 
Additionally, 526 (78%) participants identified as Caucasian, 73 (11%) identified as African 
American, 29 (4%) as Hispanic, 3 (0.4%) as Asian and 25 (4%) identified with other 
nationalities. Finally, the mean BDI-II score for this sample was 14.92 (SD = 10.42) and mean 
BAI score 11.46 (SD = 9.52).  
The final sample that completed the full procedure for the study was 127 participants 
(28% of the invited students) (mean age = 19.12, SD = 3.02, range = 18-49). From this final 
sample, 90 (71%) participants identified as female, 34 (27%) as male, and 2 (1.59%) selected 
“other” in the gender question. Additionally, 93 (74%) participants identified as Caucasian, 15 
(12%) as African American, 7 (6%) as Hispanic, 3 (2%) as Asian, and 8 (6%) identified with 
other nationalities. Finally, the mean BDI-II score for this sample was 16.6 (SD = 10.37) and 
mean BAI score 12.72 (SD = 9.51).  
Materials 
Internalizing liability measures. Temperamental as well as fear- and distress-related 
symptomatology measures were used to create composite scores of the fear and distress 
liabilities based on the obtainment of factor scores from Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
models (see statistical analysis section for more information about the composite scores 
creation). The measures used in CFAs to model the two internalizing liabilities are described 
below. Additionally, the calculated internal consistencies of these scales are presented in Table 1.  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X). PANAS-X is a 20-item self-report 
questionnaire measuring levels of dispositional positive (PA) and negative affect (NA) (Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). It consists of two lists of mood descriptors, ten for PA (e.g., attentive, 
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interested, alert, excited) and ten for NA (e.g., distressed, upset, hostile) and participants are 
asked to rate the extent to which they experience each of these feelings. The NA dimension 
represents levels of subjective distress and unpleasurable engagement subsuming feelings of 
anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, fear, and nervousness (low NA involves states of calmness and 
serenity), while PA represents levels of engagement in pleasurable experiences subsuming 
feelings of enthusiasm, activity, and alertness (low PA involves states of sadness and lethargy; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Each item is rated on a scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or 
not at all) to 5 (extremely). Previous research has shown that PANAS-X has adequate levels of 
internal consistency (α = 0.84-0.90) and test-retest reliability in non-clinical samples (Crawford 
& Henry, 2004; Watson et al., 1988). Additionally, research has provided evidence for the 
validity of this scale. Specifically, confirmatory factor analysis with a large non-clinical sample 
has shown good fit for the structure of the two factors corresponding to PA and NA (Crawford & 
Henry, 2004). Evidence for external validity has also been provided, with PANAS-X being 
correlated with different measures of distress and psychopathology [e.g., Hopkins Symptom 
Checklist (HSCL), Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and STAI State Anxiety Scale (A -State) 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988)]. Moreover, PANAS-X has demonstrated measurement 
invariance across different demographic groups (Crawford & Henry, 2004).  
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2). The MMPI-2 is a 567-item 
self- report questionnaire on which participants are asked to indicate whether statements apply to 
them by answering “true” or “false” (Butcher et al., 2001). Three scales from the MMPI-2 were 
used in the proposed study: Demoralization (RCd), Dysfunctional Negative Emotions (RC7), and 
Fears (FRS) scales. RCd consists of 24 items and represents general distress (Tellegen et al., 
2003). RC7 consists of 24 items and is strongly related to stress reactivity, fear, and anger- 
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hostility. FRS consists of 23 items and assesses several specific fears and a general tendency 
toward fearfulness. RCd and RC7 correspond to Watson and Tellegen’s (1985) pleasantness- 
unpleasantness and NA affect dimensions, respectively. Research has shown that RCd is a 
primary marker of distress disorders, whereas RC7 is a primary marker of fear disorders 
(Sellbom et al., 2008). Previous research has supported the reliability and validity of these scales. 
More specifically, these scales have shown good internal consistency (α = 0.72-0.95; Sellbom et 
al., 2008; Graham, 2011). Additionally, evidence for convergent validity has been provided by 
studies showing high correlations with normal range personality traits and symptom measures, 
such as the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ; Sellbom, & Ben-Porath, 2005) 
and the Symptom Checklist 90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Ben-Porath, McCully, & Almagor, 1993). 
Finally, evidence for incremental validity has been provided as large studies have shown that 
these scales highly predict internalizing-related conditions; Sellbom et al., 2008; Ben-Porath, 
McCully, & Almagor, 1993).  
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS). BHS is a 20-item self-report questionnaire measuring 
three aspects of hopelessness: feelings about the future, loss of motivation, and expectations 
(Beck & Steer, 1988). The measure comprises 11 negatively phrased and 9 positively phrased 
items. Participants are asked to indicate whether the statements apply to them or not. The total 
score is the sum of the individual item scores. Previous research had demonstrated that BHS has 
adequate internal consistency (α = 0.82-0.93) in clinical and nonclinical populations, general 
psychiatric, forensic psychiatric, and college samples (Beck & Steer, 1988; Chang et al., 1994). 
Evidence for concurrent validity of BHS has been provided by comparing scale scores of 
outpatient and hospitalized patients with clinical ratings of hopelessness and with other tests 
designed to measure negative attitudes about the future (r = 0.63-0.74; Beck et al., 1974). 
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Evidence for predictive validity has been provided by findings showing high correlation between 
hopelessness scores and depression in college and clinical populations (Alford et al., 1995). 
Finally, convergent and discriminant validity has been supported by studies investigating its 
correlations with selected MMPI-2 scales (Thackston-Hawkins et al., 1994), the Optimism and 
Pessimism subscales of the Life Orientation Test (Scheier & Carver, 1985), and the Optimism 
and Pessimism Scale (Dember, Martin, Hummer, Howe, & Melton, 1989).  
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). BDI is a 21-item questionnaire measuring depressive 
thoughts and attitudes (Beck et al., 1961). In each item participants are asked to choose between 
four statements of increasing severity. High scores indicate high levels of depression. BDI was 
used in the screening process of the study to assess the levels of depression symptomatology of 
participants. This instrument has been widely used in research and clinical practice to assess the 
intensity of depression in clinical populations and detect depression in non-clinical populations. 
BDI has demonstrated good psychometric properties. Specifically, a meta-analysis of the BDI’s 
internal consistency estimates yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86 for psychiatric patients and 
0.81 for non-clinical samples (Beck, Steer, & Carbin, 1988). Good test-retest reliability has been 
demonstrated in psychiatric and non-psychiatric populations with estimates in different studies 
ranging from r = 0.62 to 0.90. Convergent validity has also been supported with BDI scores of 
psychiatric patients highly correlating with clinical ratings and the Hamilton Psychiatric Rating 
Scale for Depression (HRSD; 0.72 and 0.73, respectively). In non-clinical samples the 
correlations with clinical ratings and HRSD scores were 0.60 and 0.74 respectively. Finally, 
research indicates that the BDI discriminates among different types of depression, and 
differentiates depression from anxiety (Beck, Steer, & Carbin, 1988).  
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI). BAI is 21-item self-report questionnaire measuring 
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symptoms of anxiety, in somatic and cognitive areas (Beck et al., 1988). Participants are asked to 
indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with a given statement. Participant responses 
range from 0 (not at all) to 3 (severely, I could barely stand it). The total score ranges from 0 to 
63. This instrument was developed in response to the need for a measure of clinical anxiety that 
would adequately differentiate from depression compared to other anxiety measures such as the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) and the Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (SRAS). The BAI was 
also used in the screening process of this study. This scale has demonstrated good psychometric 
properties. Based on psychiatric and outpatient samples BAI has demonstrated high internal 
consistency (α = 0.92-0.94). Additionally, good test-retest reliability has been shown as indicated 
by the high correlation of the scores of patients from the intake and several days later ranging 
from r = 0.67 to 0.75 (Beck et al., 1988; Fydrich et al., 1992). Concurrent and discriminant 
validity has also been supported by previous research. Specifically, the BAI was moderately 
correlated with the revised Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale (r = 0.51) and less correlated with the 
revised Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (r = 0.25; Beck et al., 1988). Additionally, the BAI 
have been found to discriminate between anxious and non-anxious diagnostic groups.  
Fear Questionnaire (FQ). FQ is a 15-item self-report measure consisted of three 
subscales, each of which includes five items measuring levels of phobic avoidance related to 
agoraphobia, social phobia, and blood/injury phobia (Marks & Mathews, 1979). Participants are 
asked to rate each item based on a 9-point scale (0 = would not avoid it, 8 = would always avoid 
it). Scores range from 0-40 in each subscale and the total score is the sum of the subscales 
(ranging from 0 to 120). Previous research with clinical samples of phobic patients indicates that 
FQ has good internal consistency (α = 0.83 for the total scale and 0.71-0.81 for the subscales; 
Marks & Mathews, 1979; Oei et al., 1991). The test-retest reliability of this scale has been found 
EMOTION REGULATION IN DISTRESS AND FEAR LIABILITIES          27 
adequate ranging from r = 0.79 to 0.96. Factor analysis in a clinical sample of phobic patients 
has supported the three-factor structure of FQ (Oei et al., 1991).  
Adult Temperament Questionnaire-Short Form (ATQ). ATQ-short form is a 77-item 
self- report measure assessing four dimensions of temperament: effortful control, negative affect, 
extraversion/surgency, and orienting sensitivity (Evans & Rothbart, 2007). Participants are asked 
to give their best estimate of how well each statement describes them on a 7-point scale (0 = 
extremely untrue of you, 7 = extremely true of you). Scores range from 0-7 in each subscale, 
which is the average of item scores. Each of these dimensions include sub-constructs. Negative 
affect, which includes the sub-constructs of fear, sadness, discomfort, and frustration, was 
included in the current study. This instrument has shown good internal consistency (a = 0.72- 
0.78 for the scales used in the current study) (Evans & Rothbart, 2007). Additionally, evidence 
for its structural validity has been provided through Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor 
Analyses, and for its convergence validity through the examination of its associations with other 
temperament and personality measures (Evans & Rothbart, 2007).  
Demoralization Scale (DS-II). DS-II is a self-report questionnaire intended to measure 
feelings of hopelessness, helplessness, pessimism, and motivation to cope (Robinson et al., 
2016). It consists of 16 items divided into two subscales (8 items each): distress and coping 
subscale, and meaning and purpose subscale. Participants are asked to report how often they feel 
a number of feelings in a 3-point scale, including 0 (never), 1 (sometimes), and 2 (often). The 
total score is calculated by summing individual item scores and it ranges from 0 to 32. Previous 
research has demonstrated good internal consistency (meaning and purpose in life subscale: a = 
0.84; distress and coping subcale: a = 0.82; total DS: a = 0.89) and test-retest reliability 
(meaning and purpose in life subscale: r = 0.68; distress and coping subcale: r = 0.82; total DS: r 
EMOTION REGULATION IN DISTRESS AND FEAR LIABILITIES          28 
= 0.80) (Robinson et al., 2016). Additionally, DS-II has shown convergent validity with 
measures of psychological distress and quality of life and discriminant validity as evidenced by 
its moderate correlation with depression (Robinson et al., 2016).  
Emotion-regulation choice. Participants viewed pictures included in the widely used in 
affective science International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2008). IAPS was developed to provide a set of standardized emotional stimuli that would be used 
in experimental studies of emotion and attention (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). A 
dimensional conceptualization of emotion was used for the development of this pictorial system. 
The pictures included in IAPS variate depending on normative ratings of elicited emotions based 
on three dimensions: affective valence (ranging from pleasant to unpleasant), arousal (ranging 
from calm to excited), and dominance (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). For this study, instead 
of categorizing pictures in low and high intensity groups, we selected 80 pictures with ratings in 
the full range of the arousal dimension (mean = 5.53, SD = 1.03, range = 3.46-7.35) and differing 
levels of negative valence (mean = 2.73, SD = 0.66, range = 1.51-3.92). This way, we were able 
to assess emotional intensity dimensionally in the main analyses maximizing the statistical 
information contained in this variable. Additionally, two picture contents from the IAPS were 
used, one evoking fear and one evoking sadness, as these contents are more relevant to 
individuals with a tendency to develop internalizing psychopathology. 
Procedure  
First, an Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was acquired before data collection. 
Before initiating the study procedures, participants were provided with a description of the 
purposes of the research, the expected duration of the participation, as well as a description of the 
procedures to be followed. Participants were then asked to provide a written consent for their 
EMOTION REGULATION IN DISTRESS AND FEAR LIABILITIES          29 
participation. The study was conducted in a research laboratory at Ball State University.  
The procedures used to test the research hypotheses were similar to Sheppes et al. (2014). 
Participants were randomly assigned in two conditions – long-term goal and short-term goal 
condition – and in each condition they viewed pictures of differing levels of emotional intensity. 
In the short-term goal condition, participants were told to consider for each picture both 
strategies (distraction and reappraisal) and select the one that is expected to make them feel less 
negative. In the long-term goal condition, participants were informed that they would encounter 
all pictures more than one time in the study. Participants clicked on an icon labeled with their 
preferred strategy to make their selection. Participants were randomly assigned to complete 
either the experimental task or the self-report measure first to avoid order effects.  
Regarding the experimental procedure, first, a four-trial training phase was conducted, 
during which participants viewed emotionally charged pictures and were given instructions on 
how to use distraction or reappraisal. The instructions were the same used in Sheppes’ et al. 
(2014) study. Specifically, regarding distraction, participants were asked to reduce their initial 
emotionally negative response toward a picture by attempting to think something unrelated to the 
picture. In the case of reappraisal, participants were asked to reduce their negative emotional 
experience toward the picture by changing its meaning. Specific examples were presented to 
ensure complete comprehension of the task. An extended description of the instructions can be 
found in Appendix A.  
In the second phase, participants had eight practice trials. In the first four trials, they 
practiced both strategies and in the second four, they were given the opportunity to freely choose 
among strategies. During the trials, participants were told to talk out loud when implementing the 
strategies, in order to ensure adherence with the instructions. In the main phase of the 
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experiment, participants were presented with each picture for 500 ms. After the initial 
presentation of each picture participants were given the choice to select the strategy they 
preferred, distraction or reappraisal. After the selection, they implemented the strategy viewing 
the picture for 5000 ms.  
After the completion of the experimental procedure, the participants were given the self- 
report measures of internalizing difficulties. After the completion of instruments, any questions 
or concerns were properly addressed. 
Statistical Analysis  
Descriptive statistics of the measured variables were first obtained, including means and 
standard deviations for the quantitative variables and frequencies/ percentages for the categorical 
variables. Then, bivariate analyses were performed by calculating correlations between the 
quantitative variables of the study using Spearman’s rho. The Spearman’s rho coefficient was 
preferred compared to the parametric Pearson’s r (Pearson, 1896), because the assumption of 
normality was violated in the distributions of several variables included in the study. The 
univariate normality assumption was assessed through the evaluation of skewness and kurtosis 
(see Table 1), and graphically through Q-Q plots.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was conducted to model the fear and distress 
liabilities. Factor scores of the two liabilities were obtained and later used in the main analyses. 
The estimator used was the Robust Maximum Likelihood (MLR) estimator (Muthén & Muthén, 
2010). This estimator was preferred to the regular Maximum Likelihood estimator because of 
evidence of violations of univariate normality of some of the scales used as indicators. A two- 
factor model was initially considered with the distress and fear liabilities as latent factors with 
the observed indicators: BDI-II, BAI, RCd, BHS, and DS for the distress liability, and NA of 
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PANAS-X, RC7, FQ, and NA of ATQ for the fear liability. A model fit to the data via CFA has 
to have a good fit. The fit of the CFA model is assessed through fit indices. In the absence of 
good fit, model respecification can be conducted (Brown, 2014). In this study, Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker–Lewis fit Index 
(TLI), and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) were examined to evaluate the fit 
of each of the proposed models. Good fit of the model was defined as a value of TLI and CFI 
indices > 0.95 and a value of RMSEA < 0.06 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
Given the suboptimal fit indices of the original model, an alternate model was also 
assessed focusing on the fear piece of negative affectivity in the fear liability. Specifically, the 
measures used as indicators of the distress liability were RCd, BHS, DS, BDI-II and BAI, and 
the measures used as indicators of the fear liability were the fear subscale of ATQ, FQ, and FRS. 
One-factor models were also evaluated constraining all scale indicators to load on one factor, the 
internalizing liability. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) was used to compare 
the different fitted models. AIC is a measure of the relative quality of a given model. Lower 
values of AIC indicate better fit of the model.  
The study hypotheses were tested by fitting logistic regression models, using the 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) method for parameter estimation (Liang & Zeger, 
1986). This method enables the modeling of categorical outcomes, while taking into account the 
potential association of the repeated observations within a given participant. In this study each 
participant chose an emotion regulation strategy in response to emotion-provoking pictures, 80 
different times. Therefore, the strategy selection observations were expected to be correlated 
within each participant.  
The two general study hypotheses, that is, maladaptive evaluation of regulatory strategies 
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in fear and distress liabilities, were tested by evaluating the moderation effects of distress and 
fear liabilities on the effect of emotional intensity and goal proximity on strategy selection 
(binary dependent variable: distraction vs. reappraisal). Two models were fit to the data. In the 
first model, the moderating effects of the two liabilities on the relationship between emotional 
intensity and strategy selection were tested. In the second model, the moderating effects of the 
two liabilities on the relationship between goal proximity and strategy selection were tested. In 
the emotional intensity analysis, the goal proximity variable was included in the model to control 
for its potential effects on strategy selection. Similarly, in the goal proximity analysis, the 
emotional intensity variable was included in the model. All continuous predictors were mean 
centered to avoid multicolinearity. Post hoc analyses were conducted to evaluate differences in 
the assessed relationship across different picture contents (i.e., fear vs. sad content). More 
specifically, two separate analyses were conducted containing either responses to only fear- 
provoking pictures or only sadness-provoking pictures.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics of the distress (DISTRESS) and fear (FEAR) liability scores 
obtained by modeling Internalizing liability, as well as other measures included in the study are 
shown in Table 1. In this table, means and standard deviations of the study variables are 
presented. 
Bivariate Correlations  
Bivariate correlations between continuous variables were computed using Spearman’s 
rho. The results are presented in Table 2. All correlations were statistically significant. The 
calculated correlation between variables varied from weak (e.g., rho = 0.19 between FRS and 
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DS) to strong (e.g., rho = 0.85 between BDI and DS) in size. These results provided some initial 
evidence for a common vulnerability that would give rise to the observed associations between 
variables. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Factor Scores Acquisition  
Subsequently, the hypothesized two-factor model of distress and fear liabilities that give 
rise to the observed temperamental and symptom measure scores was fit to the data. Fit indices 
for all tested models are presented in Table 3. As shown in Table 3, the initial model did not fit 
the data well (RMSEA = 0.146 [90% CI = 0.116-0.176], CFI = 0.908, TLI = 0.873, SRMR = 
0.049). A potential reason for this suboptimal fit was the very high correlation of distress and 
fear factors (b = 0.977, p < 0.001). Given this finding, a revised two-factor model was considered 
excluding measures of general negative affectivity, which likely inflated the association observed 
between the distress and fear factors. This is justifiable because negative affectivity is shared 
between distress and fear liabilities, although more characteristic of fear (Sellbom et al., 2008). 
The revised model better fit the data (RMSEA = 0.072 [90% CI = 0.017-0.114], CFI = 0.978, 
TLI = 0.967, SRMR = 0.034). One-factor models were also considered as baseline models to 
check whether they had a better fit compared to the examined two-factor models. The revised 
two-factor model had the lowest AIC and for this reason it was the one used in further analyses. 
The Bartlett’s approach was used to extract the distress and fear factor scores. This procedure is 
a refined method of factor score extraction and is found to produce unbiased estimates of the true 
factor scores (Hershberger, 2005). The revised model is depicted in Figure 1, along with the item 
loadings and error variances.  
Fear and Distress Moderation Models  
For the main analyses, two logistic regression models, estimated using GEE, were fit to 
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the data. In the first model (Table 4), the moderating effects of DISTRESS and FEAR on the 
relationship between emotional intensity and strategy selection were tested. Smaller effects of 
emotional intensity on strategy selection as levels of the two liabilities increased were 
hypothesized. Results indicated that the moderation effect of FEAR on the relationship between 
emotional intensity and strategy selection was statistically significant (p-value <0.001). In 
contrast to the initial hypothesis, as shown in Figure 2, as FEAR increased, the effect of 
emotional intensity on odds of distraction came more pronounced. In other words, higher levels 
of FEAR (shown as +1 SD in Figure 2) were associated with a higher likelihood of choosing 
distraction in response to emotionally intense stimuli compared to lower levels of FEAR (shown 
as -1 SD in Figure 2). The significance of the effect of emotional intensity on strategy selection 
in mean, -1 SD, and +1 SD levels of FEAR assessed with Wald tests. The results from these tests 
showed that the effect was significant across all levels of FEAR (all p-values<0.001). Results 
also indicated that the moderating effect of DISTRESS on the effect of emotional intensity on 
strategy selection was not statistically significant (p-value = 0.351). However, the effect of 
DISTRESS on the odds of choosing distraction was significant (OR = 0.89, p-value <0.001). 
More specifically, as DISTRESS increased the selection of distraction became less likely and the 
selection of reappraisal became more likely.  
In the second model (Table 5), the moderating effects of DISTRESS and FEAR on the 
relationship between goal proximity and strategy selection were tested. Smaller effects of goal 
proximity on strategy selection as levels of the two liabilities increased were hypothesized. 
Neither DISTRESS (p-value = 0.204) nor FEAR (p-value = 0.678) moderated the relationship 
between goal proximity and strategy selection. However, the main effects of DISTRESS (OR = 
0.92, p-value = 0.024) and FEAR (OR = 1.26, p-value <0.001) were statistically significant 
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(Figure 3). More specifically, higher levels of DISTRESS were associated with an increased 
chance of selecting reappraisal, although the effect was small (i.e., for one unit increase of 
DISTRESS, the likelihood of choosing to reappraise increased by 8%). On the other hand, higher 
levels of FEAR were associated with increased chance of choosing to distract. This effect was 
larger, as for one unit increase on FEAR the likelihood of choosing to distract increased by 26%. 
Additionally, goal proximity was associated with strategy selection. In fact, participants in the 
long-term condition were 17% less likely to choose distraction over reappraisal than in the short-
term condition (OR = 0.83, p-value <0.001). 
Post-hoc Analyses  
To assess whether the picture content affected the findings of the main analyses, separate 
post hoc analyses were conducted including responses to either only fear- or only sadness- 
provoking pictures. The first set of subgroup analyses evaluated the moderating effect of 
DISTRESS and FEAR on the relationship between emotional intensity and strategy selection 
separately in different picture contents (Table 6). FEAR significantly moderated the effect of 
emotional intensity on odds of distraction in both subgroup analyses. However, the moderation 
effect was larger when only fear-provoking pictures were included in the analysis (fear content: 
p-value <0.001; sadness content: p-value <0.001). The moderation effect of distress was 
nonsignificant in both subgroup analyses.  
The second set of subgroup analyses evaluated the moderating effect of DISTRESS and 
FEAR on goal proximity and strategy selection separately in different picture contents (Table 7). 
Moderating effects were nonsignificant in both FEAR (fear content: p-value = 0.384; sadness 
content: p-value = 0.827) and DISTRESS (fear content: p-value = 0.075; sadness content: p- 
value = 0.875).  
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Discussion 
The goal of this study was to examine a mechanism through which fear and distress 
liabilities are linked to deficits in the emotion regulation process. More specifically, this study 
addressed four research questions. The first question was whether the evaluation process of 
emotion regulation strategy selection differs across different levels of stimuli emotional intensity 
as a function of the fear liability. That is, does a tendency toward fearfulness affect the 
relationship between emotional intensity of emotion provoking pictures and the selection of early 
versus late disengagement emotion regulation strategies? The second question was whether the 
evaluation process of strategy selection differs across different levels of emotional intensity as a 
function of the distress liability. That is, does a tendency toward experiencing distress affect the 
relationship between emotional intensity and the selection of early versus late disengagement 
emotion regulation strategies? The third question was whether the evaluation process of strategy 
selection differs across different goal proximity conditions as a function of the fear liability. That 
is, does fear proneness affect the relationship between goal proximity (long- versus short-term 
goals) and the selection of emotion regulation strategies? The fourth question was whether the 
evaluation process of strategy selection differs across different goal proximity conditions as a 
function of the distress liability. That is, does the distress liability affect the relationship between 
goal proximity (long- versus short-term goals) and the selection of early versus late 
disengagement emotion regulation strategies? The research hypotheses were assessed by testing 
the moderating effects of the distress and fear liabilities on the relationship between: 1) 
emotional intensity and strategy selection, and 2) goal proximity and strategy selection.  
The first research hypothesis was partially supported by the data. Specifically, the fear 
liability significantly moderated the effect of emotional intensity on the odds of choosing to 
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distract. Indeed, increased standing on the fear liability was associated with an increased 
preference for early disengagement distraction. However, the moderating effect had the opposite 
direction to that hypothesized. Additionally, post hoc analysis revealed a larger moderation effect 
among fear- provoking picture content compared to sadness-provoking content. The second 
hypothesis of a moderating effect of the distress liability in the relationship between emotional 
intensity and strategy selection was not supported by the data. However, higher standing on the 
distress liability was associated with a stronger tendency to use late disengagement reappraisal in 
general. Post hoc subgroup analyses on different picture contents (i.e., fear- and sad-related 
content) did not show a significant moderation effect in either of picture contents. The third and 
fourth research hypotheses were not supported, since the moderation effects of the fear and 
distress liabilities on the relationship between goal proximity and strategy selection were not 
statistically significant in either the main or the content subgroup analyses. However, significant 
main effects were found between the liabilities and strategy selection. The odds of distraction 
increased as standing on the fear liability increased, while the odds of reappraisal increased as 
standing on the distress liability increased. Additionally, the effect of goal proximity on strategy 
selection was significant. People were more likely to choose reappraisal, if the goal was long 
term.  
According to the research findings, the fear liability was a significant moderator in the 
relationship between emotional intensity and strategy selection. As hypothesized, individuals 
with higher levels of fear liability were, on average, more likely to choose early disengagement 
distraction over late disengagement reappraisal. This finding is in line with previous research 
suggesting a tendency of individuals with fear disorders to disengage from fear-provoking 
emotional information (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Garner et al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2004; 
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Pflugshaupt et al., 2005). This tendency has been linked to attentional biases toward threat which 
affect emotion regulation goals and elicit attentional avoidance (Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
However, in contrast to the initial hypothesis, the effect of emotional intensity on the odds of 
choosing distraction became larger as the fear liability increased, instead of smaller as 
hypothesized. In other words, the odds of selecting distraction were not elevated across all levels 
of the fear liability as expected, but increased from low to high odds, and even more steeply 
compared to lower levels of the liability. Therefore, the fear liability had a synergistic effect on 
the relationship between emotional intensity and distraction selection, intensifying this 
association. This suggests that individuals with a higher tendency toward fearfulness are able to 
recognize that different types of strategies have differential costs and benefits depending on the 
levels of emotional intensity. However, it seems that emotional intensity makes the selection of 
distraction even more likely at higher levels compared to lower levels of the fear liability. This 
finding was further probed with subgroup analyses across different picture contents. This set of 
analyses identified a larger moderation effect of fear in the relationship between emotional 
intensity and odds of choosing distraction, when only fear-provoking pictures were included in 
the analysis. This result is in line with findings showing selective attention of individuals with 
fear-related disorders toward concern-relevant external stimuli (or fear-provoking stimuli; 
Harvey et al., 2004), which might trigger increased use of distraction to protect themselves from 
them. However, it is worth mentioning that when only sad-provoking pictures were included in 
the analysis, the selection of distraction was still more frequent across high levels of fear 
proneness as emotional intensity increased. This finding points to a general tendency of 
individuals with fear liability to select distraction in response to negative emotional stimuli 
(although this choice is more pronounced in response to fear-relevant stimuli).  
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The second study hypothesis was not supported by the data. That is, distress liability did 
not have a moderating effect on the relationship between emotional intensity and strategy 
selection as hypothesized. Although the moderation effect was not supported, the main effect of 
the distress liability on the odds of choosing late disengagement reappraisal was significant. This 
suggests that individuals with distress proneness might not have a difficulty in understanding that 
the two types of strategies are differentially beneficial across different levels of emotional 
intensity. However, they do have a tendency to consider reappraisal as more beneficial than 
distraction compared to individuals with lower levels of distress proneness. The results showed 
that as proneness to distress increased the odds of reappraisal selection increased as well 
(although the effect was small). This is in line with literature suggesting that individuals with 
distress-related disorders, such as depression or generalized anxiety, are more likely to choose to 
excessively engage with emotion (Sheppes et al., 2014). However, the specific engagement 
strategy that was used in this study has generally been considered as an adaptive strategy that 
individuals with distress-related disorders tend not to use (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2010). The logic behind the initial hypothesis (which was supported by the results of 
the study) that individuals with high distress proneness would be more likely to choose 
reappraisal was based on several interesting past research findings. Specifically, it has been 
suggested that reappraisal shares a cognitive mechanism and neural basis with rumination, as 
well as a tendency to attend to the emotional information elicited by a situation and the active 
processing of its negative meaning (Cohen et al., 2014; Ray et al., 2005). However, the 
successful execution of reappraisal depends on intact executive functioning (Raio et al., 2013). A 
potential explanation of why individuals with distress-related disorders do not end up using this 
strategy is that its implementation might fail due to an entrapment in a cycle of rumination. This 
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could be due to impaired response inhibition, an executive function facet (Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2003; Simpson & Papageorgiou, 2003). This impairment could be caused by increased 
levels of distress, which make the effective application of the strategy less likely (Raio et al., 
2013). This would be an interesting route for future research.  
The finding that long-term goals were associated with higher chance of choosing 
reappraisal was in accordance with past literature. Reappraisal enables engagement with 
emotional information, which makes it highly effective in regulating emotion when long-term 
relief is sought (Sheppes et al. 2011, 2014). Distraction, on the other hand, is less adaptive for 
long term goals, because it does not allow engagement and dealing with the emotional 
information at hand (Sheppes et al. 2011, 2014). Therefore, an adaptive emotion regulation 
choice profile involves choosing reappraisal when the goal is long-term. This hypothesis was 
supported by the data, since the choice of reappraisal was significantly more frequent in the long- 
term condition. However, the last two research hypotheses stating that the distress and fear 
liabilities would be related to a suboptimal cost-benefits analysis with a result the lack of 
differentiation between strategies in the goal proximity conditions was not supported by the data. 
This nonsignificant result could be attributed to aspects of how we tested this question. Namely, 
low statistical power could lead to inability to detect an existing effect. Also, the levels of 
internalizing liability were relatively low, because the sample consisted of students and did not 
come from a clinical population. As a result, there was a restricted range of liability values in the 
sample which might have resulted in attenuated estimated effects. However, it may be that 
individuals with high distress and fear liabilities do not have difficulties differentiating between 
the costs and benefits of strategies in short versus long-term goals. This would mean that 
individuals with high standing in the internalizing liability are able to take into account how 
EMOTION REGULATION IN DISTRESS AND FEAR LIABILITIES          41 
proximal or distal their emotion regulation goal is, when making decisions among regulatory 
strategies. If this hypothesis is true, it would mean that other steps in the emotion regulation 
process are responsible for the poor emotion regulation often observed in individuals with a 
tendency toward internalizing difficulties (Aldao et al., 2013). For example, it could be that 
individuals prone to fear or distress have difficulties implementing the selected regulatory tactic 
or have deficits in monitoring the effectiveness of their selected strategy across time, and modify 
it as necessary (Sheppes et al., 2015). One reason for this could be low emotion regulation-
related self-efficacy. That is, individuals with high levels of internalizing might not be as 
confident in their abilities to successfully use a certain strategy that they consider adaptive, 
resulting in a premature stopping of an activated emotion regulation response (Sheppes et al., 
2015). 
This study has several limitations that are worth noting. This study considered emotional 
intensity and goal proximity as two contextual factors that influence the assignment of specific 
weights when evaluating available regulatory strategies. Although people with high fear and 
distress liabilities might not have difficulties in identifying costs and benefits of emotion 
regulation strategies based on these contextual factors, they might have difficulties to take into 
account other factors in their emotion regulation decision-making process. Some of those factors 
identified as central when making a decision as to what strategy would be more beneficial in 
regulating emotion are cognitive and physiological resources (Baumeister, 2003; Beedie & Lane, 
2012; Urry & Gross, 2010) and the beliefs that someone has about their ability to effectively use 
a given emotion regulation strategy (low emotion regulation-related self-efficacy; Sheppes et al., 
2015). The study of the evaluation of these factors might lead to different conclusions about the 
ability of individuals with high distress and fear proneness to differentiate among strategies. 
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Similarly, a different set of emotion regulation strategies might also lead to different results. 
Although individuals high in the distress and fear liabilities might be able to adequately discern 
the costs and benefits of distraction relative to reappraisal, they might have difficulties with other 
disengagement versus engagement strategies. Further examination of additional contextual 
factors, in combination with different strategies would be an interesting route for future research. 
This would help us develop a more comprehensive picture about the difficulties that individuals 
prone to experience fear and distress have in their emotion regulation decision-making. This 
investigation would also help clinicians to identify where problems in the regulation of emotion 
lie for these individuals, with a resulting ability to create and apply more suitable treatment 
plans.  
Moreover, due to time and resources constraints, this study focused on a specific element 
of the selection stage of the emotion regulation process. Emotion regulation is a complex, 
dynamic process encompassing a number of valuation systems that iterate across time (Gross, 
2015, Sheppes et al., 2015). It involves decisions on what emotions individuals choose to 
regulate, with what available strategies and specific tactics, and how they implement these 
tactics. To create a more accurate picture of how individuals high in distress and fear 
vulnerability make these decisions, a study design that enables researchers to capture the 
dynamic aspects of this phenomenon and how it changes over time would be appropriate. Such a 
design would enable the isolation of difficulties specific to a given stage controlling for 
difficulties carried through from earlier stages of the emotion regulation process. For example, 
the finding that individuals high in fear liability are more likely to choose distraction over 
reappraisal when emotional intensity is high might be a product of dysfunctions in the emotion 
generation process or the identification stage of emotion regulation and not a dysfunction in later 
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stages of the process. A research design that incorporates all of these stages measured 
sequentially could help resolving such ambiguities.  
Finally, some methodological limitations should be mentioned. First, the study sample 
was relatively small. This might account for the lack of significant moderating effects in the goal 
proximity analysis. Also, due to this limitation, we were not able to fit structural equation models 
to evaluate the moderating role of the internalizing liabilities in the relationship of emotional 
intensity and goal proximity with strategy selection. Instead, we had to run logistic regressions 
using factor scores to represent the liabilities. Obtainment and use of factor scores in further 
analyses has raised objections in the literature (DiStefano, Zhu, & Mindrila, 2009). Therefore, in 
the future, the results of this study should be replicated using a more refined, latent variable 
modeling approach.  
In conclusion, this study had two general objectives. Driven by criticisms of the 
predominant nosological system (Krueger & Markon, 2006a), the first objective was to direct 
emotion regulation and psychopathology research away from specific, DSM-defined, mental 
disorders. This was achieved by conceptualizing and operationalizing internalizing 
psychopathology as variations in a spectrum. The second objective was driven by a movement in 
the field of emotion regulation to incorporate other emotion regulation processes, beyond 
strategy use, in its definition (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015). This enables the consideration of 
difficulties in stages that precede strategy implementation and, thus, potentially mediate the 
relationship between emotion generation and successful regulation of emotion. Therefore, this 
study aimed to identify deficits in the valuation element of the selection stage that individuals 
within the fear and within the distress spectrum share. Although no evidence was provided 
indicating an inability of people standing high on the internalizing liabilities to recognize that the 
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two types of strategies are differentially beneficial as a function of contextual factors, there was 
evidence for differential consideration of emotional intensity across levels of the fear liability. 
Additionally, a differential selection of the two strategies was shown depending on the type of 
liability. Specifically, the results of the study pointed to a tendency for over-selection of the early 
disengagement distraction in high levels of fear proneness and an over-selection of the late 
disengagement reappraisal in high levels of distress proneness. These results expanded our 
understanding of emotion regulation decision making in the internalizing psychopathology by 
identifying common tendencies of individuals who share dispositions toward fear and distress 
proneness. This provides some initial evidence that challenges in emotion regulation are not 
disorder- specific, but common among shared higher-order liabilities underlying internalizing 
psychopathology. This is important from a clinical perspective, because given that 
transdiagnostic treatments are more and more frequently applied in clinical settings, it gives 
clinicians direction as to what specific strategy to target in treatment that would alleviate 
difficulties related to multiple disorders in the internalizing spectrum.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive measures 
  Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p-value Alpha 
Skewness/ 
Kurtosis 
  Total Female Male       
DISTRESS 0.00 (1.03) 0.09 (1.03) -0.34 (0.90) 0.030 - 0.28/ 1.97 
FEAR 0.00 (1.17) 0.21 (1.10) -0.59 (1.17) 0.001 - 0.02/ 2.98 
BHS 5.76 (4.61) 6.07 (4.60) 4.44 (4.17) 0.070 0.87 0.84/ 2.62 
DS 12.17 (7.41) 12.84 (7.51) 9.43 (6.33) 0.020 0.94 0.12/ 1.93 
MMPI-2        
   RCd 11.42 (7.41) 11.50 (7.14) 10.60 (7.87) 0.600 0.93 0.03/ 1.67 
   RC7 11.5 (5.65) 11.90 (5.33) 10.00 (6.19) 0.100 0.87 -0.14/ 1.98 
   FRS 6.09 (3.38) 6.90 (3.34) 4.03 (2.56) <0.001 0.68 0.15/ 1.92 
BDI 17.03 (10.71) 17.40 (10.30) 14.40 (10.30) 0.200 0.93 0.65/ 2.73 
BAI 13.62 (9.91) 14.70 (10.30) 10.00 (8.14) 0.020 0.91 0.90/ 3.28 
FQ 37.52 (17.94) 40.30 (17.50) 29.30 (16.50) 0.002 0.82 0.39/ 2.99 
ATQ        
   Fear 4.09 (1) 4.22 (0.96) 3.71 (1.03) 0.020 0.68 -0.08/ 3.03 
   NA 4.19 (0.79) 4.31 (0.72) 3.82 (0.88) 0.006 0.83 -0.42/ 4.19 
PANAS        
   NA 22.37 (7.51) 22.80 (7.57) 20.60 (6.81) 0.100 0.89 0.46/ 2.68 
Notes. BHS = Beck’s Hopelessness Scale; DS = Demoralization Scale; RCd = Demoralization scale; RC7 = 
Dysfunctional Negative Emotions scale; FRS = Fears scale; BDI = Beck’s Depression Inventory; BAI = Beck’s 
Anxiety Inventory; FQ = Fear Questionnaire; NA = negative affect. 
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix using Spearman rho. 
Notes. BHS = Beck’s Hopelessness Scale; DS = Demoralization Scale; RCd = Demoralization scale; RC7 = Dysfunctional Negative Emotions scale; FRS = Fears 
scale; BDI = Beck’s Depression Inventory; BAI = Beck’s Anxiety Inventory; FQ = Fear Questionnaire; PNA = PANAS-X Negative Affect scale. *p-value<0.05, 
**p-value<0.01, p-value<0.001. 
  DISTRESS FEAR BHS DS RCd BDI BAI FATQ FQ RC7 FRS Age 
DISTRESS 1            
FEAR 0.55*** 1           
BHS 0.82*** 0.45*** 1          
DS 0.97*** 0.53*** 0.74*** 1         
RCd 0.89*** 0.5*** 0.74*** 0.83*** 1        
BDI 0.92*** 0.5*** 0.75*** 0.85*** 0.75*** 1       
BAI 0.81*** 0.51*** 0.62*** 0.75*** 0.65*** 0.76*** 1      
FATQ 0.53*** 0.9*** 0.38*** 0.53*** 0.5*** 0.45*** 0.47*** 1     
FQ 0.39*** 0.68*** 0.4*** 0.36*** 0.31*** 0.37*** 0.32*** 0.4*** 1    
RC7 0.76*** 0.52*** 0.6*** 0.72*** 0.8*** 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.46*** 0.28** 1   
FRS 0.28** 0.65*** 0.28** 0.25** 0.22* 0.28** 0.3** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 1  
Age -0.17 -0.15 -0.07 -0.18 -0.17 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 -0.02 1 
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Table 3 
Fit Indices of the four tested Internalizing models. 
Model χ2 df p-value CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA AIC 
1-Factor Model (Initial) 760.95 36 <0.001 0.908 0.877 0.050 0.149 6333.76 
1-Factor Model (Revised) 538.610 28 <0.001 0.939 0.914 0.065 0.116 5631.217 
2-Factor Model (Initial) 760.95 36 <0.001 0.908 0.873 0.049 0.146 6334.66 
2-Factor Model (Revised) 538.610 28 <0.001 0.978 0.967 0.034 0.072 5610.765 
Note: 1-Factor Model (Initial): Demoralization, negative affect, and distress and fear symptomatology scales loaded onto one 
Internalizing factor; 1-Factor Model (Revised): Demoralization, fearfulness tendency, and distress and fear symptomatology 
scales loaded onto one Internalizing factor; 2-Factor Model (Initial): Model with two correlated factors – demoralization and 
distress symptomatology scales loaded onto the distress factor, and negative affect and fear symptomatology scales loaded onto 
the fear factor; 2-Factor Model (Revised): Model with two correlated factors – demoralization and distress symptomatology 
scales loaded onto the distress factor, and fearfulness tendency and fear symptomatology scales loaded onto a fear factor. 
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Table 4 
GEE logistic regression model for strategy selection – interactions with 
emotional intensity. 
  OR 95% CI p-value 
FEAR 1.23 1.17 - 1.30 <0.001 
DISTRESS 0.89 0.85 - 0.94 <0.001 
Intensity 1.8 1.74 - 1.90 <0.001 
Long term 0.83* 0.76 - 0.91 <0.001 
FEAR x Intensity 1.14 1.08 - 1.19 <0.001 
DISTRESS x Intensity 0.97 0.92 - 1.03 0.351 
Note: OR = Odds Ratio; OR > 1: higher odds of choosing distraction; OR < 
1: higher odds of choosing reappraisal; Intensity: Picture Emotional 
Intensity 
  * OR based on the long-term condition category of the strategy selection 
variable. 
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Table 5 
GEE logistic regression model for odds of strategy selection – interactions with 
goal proximity. 
  OR 95% CI p-value 
FEAR 1.26 1.17 - 1.35 <0.001 
DISTRESS 0.92 0.86 - 0.99 0.024 
Long term 0.83* 0.76 - 0.91 <0.001 
Intensity 1.8 1.73 - 1.89 <0.001 
FEAR x Long term 0.98 0.89 - 1.08 0.678 
DISTRESS x Long term 0.93 0.84 - 1.04 0.204 
Note. OR = Odds Ratio; OR > 1: higher odds of choosing distraction; OR < 1: 
higher odds of choosing reappraisal; Intensity: picture emotional intensity; SE = 
standard error. 
* OR based on the long-term condition category of the strategy selection 
variable. 
 
  
EMOTION REGULATION IN DISTRESS AND FEAR LIABILITIES            61 
Table 6 
GEE logistic regression model for odds of strategy selection in different emotional contents –interactions with emotional 
intensity. 
  OR 95% CI p-value   OR 95% CI p-value 
FEAR 1.16 1.08 - 1.24 <0.001  1.31 1.21 - 1.42 <0.001 
DISTRESS 0.99 0.92 - 1.06 0.778  0.8 0.73 - 0.88 <0.001 
Intensity 2.01 1.89 - 2.13 <0.001  1.74 1.61 - 1.88 <0.001 
Long Term 0.85* 0.76 - 0.96 0.009  0.80* 0.70 - 0.92 0.002 
FEAR x Intensity 1.07 1.01 - 1.15 0.031  1.18 1.08 - 1.29 <0.001 
DISTRESS x Intensity 1.05 0.98 - 1.13 0.144   0.94 0.86 - 1.03 0.20 
Note. OR = Odds Ratio; OR > 1: higher odds of choosing distraction; OR < 1: higher odds of choosing reappraisal; 
Intensity: picture emotional intensity; SE = standard error 
  * OR based on the long-term condition category of the strategy selection variable. 
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Table 7 
GEE logistic regression model for odds of strategy selection in different emotional contents – interactions with goal 
proximity. 
  OR 95% CI p-value   OR 95% CI p-value 
FEAR 1.13 1.03 - 1.24 0.009  1.46 1.31 - 1.62 <0.001 
DISTRESS 0.98 0.90 - 1.08 0.733  0.84 0.75 - 0.94 0.002 
Long Term 0.85* 0.76 - 0.96 0.009  0.80* 0.70 - 0.92 0.002 
Intensity 2 1.89 - 2.12 <0.001  1.74 1.61 - 1.88 <0.001 
FEAR x Long term 1.01 0.89 - 1.15 0.827  0.94 0.80 - 1.09 0.384 
DISTRESS x Long term 0.99 0.86 - 1.14 0.875   0.86 0.73 - 1.02 0.075 
Note. OR = Odds Ratio; OR > 1: higher odds of choosing distraction; OR < 1: higher odds of choosing reappraisal; 
Intensity: picture emotional intensity; SE = standard error 
* OR based on the long-term condition category of the strategy selection variable. 
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Figure 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis for the 2-factor Internalizing model (Revised). 
RCd = Demoralization scale of MMPI-2-RF; DS = Demoralization Scale; BHS = Beck’s 
Hopelessness Scale; FATQ = Fear scale of ATQ; FRS = Fears scale of MMPI-2-RF.  
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Figure 2. Effect of emotional intensity on strategy selection across levels of FEAR (overall p-
value < 0.001) 
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Figure 3. Effect of DISTRESS and FEAR on odds of distraction (p-values based on a model 
without interactions). 
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Appendix A 
Distraction instructions: 
“Try your best to feel less negative about the picture by thinking of something that is 
completely unrelated to the picture. There are a few ways you can do this. First, you 
could imagine your neighborhood or other familiar streets. For instance, if you see a 
negative picture of a woman who has been burnt, you could think of biking around 
campus and the different buildings around you. Second, you could imagine yourself 
doing everyday tasks, such as taking a shower or making coffee in the morning. You 
could use any one of these ways to distract yourself that you think will work best in 
making you feel less negative, and you don’t have to use the same way to distract all the 
time. However, it is important that you keep your eyes on the picture and not avert your 
gaze. Also, when distracting, it’s important that you not focus on something that is 
highly emotional, so we don’t want you to think about anything that brings you sadness 
or extreme happiness.” 
 
Reappraisal instructions: 
“Try your best to feel less negative about the picture by attending to the picture and 
trying to change the meaning of it. That means you think of something to tell yourself 
about the picture that helps you feel less negative about it. So, for example, you could 
tell yourself something about the outcome, so that whatever is going on will soon be 
resolved or that help is on the way. You could also focus on a detail of the situation that 
may not be as bad as it first seemed. But we want you to stay focused on the picture and 
not think of random things that make you feel better, but rather to change something 
about the picture that helps you to feel less negative about it. Once again, keep focusing 
on the picture but tell yourself something about the picture that makes you feel less 
negative about the picture.” 
 
